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Ethics and the Return to Strategy 
Today there is a return to strategy in the foreign and defense policies of the United States and its 
allies.  Strategy’s return has been prompted by the need to make decisions about when, where and 
how to use force to deter, disrupt and destroy individuals, groups and states that seek to upset the 
spread of democracy and free markets.  Because force is now being considered not just to deter war, 
but also to wage war, there is a need to reconsider the ethical challenges created by the return of 
strategy.  These challenges will manifest in a variety of ways, but they are likely to fall heavily on 
elected officials and military professionals as they grapple with terrorism and other unconventional 
forms of warfare and integrate new technologies into traditional force structures. 
No matter how much elected officials, soldiers or publics might hope, it is impossible to escape 
the deeply rooted international trends that have forced this return to strategy.  Austria too faces 
fundamental defense and foreign policy decisions that are shaped by this new strategic environment.  
Whether or not Austria should remain neutral or join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) as a full member is an issue that will continue to be debated by elected officials.  
Questions about force structure and defense spending also will preoccupy policymakers and soldiers 
as Austria continues to adjust to the end of the Cold War and the return of strategy.  Politically and 
strategically important issues such as conscription are likely to become highly salient in the years 
ahead.  Will Austria maintain a conventional capability to defend its territorial integrity or turn to a 
more specialized and possibly less expensive force structure intended to provide NATO with 
specialized military capabilities? Most members of NATO, for instance, neglect two areas in which 
Austria excels, peacekeeping and mountain warfare.  If they choose to do so, Austrians can make a 
real contribution to NATO.To explore some of the ethical challenges created by the return to 
strategy, the article will first describe the sources of conflict that now confront policymakers and 
soldiers. It then compares today’s international situation with the challenges faced by the West 
during the Cold War to explore how this new strategic situation is forcing policymakers to develop 
new approaches to the use of force.  The article also offers a survey of current diplomatic and 
military initiatives to identify both the good and the bad news when it comes to the ethical 
challenges created by the new strategic situation. It concludes with some observations about how 
militaries everywhere will begin to confront the social changes unleashed by globalization. 
Sources of Conflict 
Although several competing explanations exist for the wave of Islamic terrorism that is 
sweeping the world, a consensus is emerging that two factors — globalization and demographic 
pressures — are primarily responsible for the violence perpetrated by militants.  Globalization, the 
spread of Western commercial and political culture throughout the world, has placed traditional 
cultures under siege.  Democracy, market capitalism, liberalism, respect for human rights, and 
ethnic, gender and racial equality, can be highly corrosive to traditional societies because they 
appeal not to the rich or existing ruling elite, but to the emerging middle class.  The revolution in 
information technologies makes it impossible to prevent democratic ideals and concepts from 
reaching populations everywhere.  In time, these ideas will spread to disenfranchised and poverty 
stricken people everywhere, offering an ideology and economic system that empowers the 
individual at the expense of traditional society.  Militants decry globalization for the corruption it 
brings, but behind them stand societies that are fearful that globalization might somehow pass them 
by, leaving them to watch helplessly as other people grow richer at what appears to be their 
expense. 
Although unrest in the Islamic world is probably the greatest drawback produced by 
globalization, it also has produced at least three developments that create new challenges for elected 
officials, government organizations and societies.  First, societies everywhere can gain vastly from 
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wealth that is being produced by the information revolution, but at the price of having part of 
their way of life replaced by global culture. At the same time, all societies contribute part of 
themselves to a common culture; in a sense countries can shape the process of globalization by 
making sure positive and nationally preferred images of their homeland and way of life are shared 
globally. Second, as individuals become empowered by new communication, computing and 
transportation technologies, they gain in capability compared to traditional governments and 
bureaucracies.  In other words, the same developments that threaten traditional societies also 
threaten traditional governing structures. The new information revolution carries with it an 
imbedded ideology: individuals should use their new skills and technologies to make more 
decisions for themselves. Officials and bureaucrats can rely less and less on their position in 
bureaucratic hierarchies as a source of authority; constituents everywhere judge their leaders on 
their current performance, not on their institutional affiliation or official rank.  Third, the same 
technologies that provide global Internet access, inexpensive international travel, and global 
financial transactions and trade, can be used by radicals to disrupt globalization. The same 
technologies that allow scholars to collaborate with colleagues on a global basis in real time also 
can be used by fanatics and psychotics around the globe to cooperate in some nefarious scheme. 
Globalization then, might best be conceived of as a global transmission system of ideas, culture, 
wealth and people. Clearly, it has enriched and empowered individuals around the world, but at a 
price. The transmission system runs both ways, sending Western ideas and ideals to places where 
they disrupt traditional lifestyles, while at the same time transmitting a sometimes highly dangerous 
reaction from the cultural periphery. Indeed, it is possible that the 11. September attacks marked a 
new kind of warfare that is not only a response to globalization, but also a type of warfare made 
possible by globalization itself.  Globalization instills in people the idea that they should take their 
destiny into their own hands. It also empowers and equips them to shape that destiny by shaping 
world events.  In an ironic twist, globalization has not only produced a dangerous political backlash, 
it has produced a new actor – a syndicate of religious fundamentalists, revolutionaries and 
anarchists – able to threaten directly the security of the United States and its allies. Moreover, the 
same forces that are at work along the geographic periphery of the new global culture are at work in 
Western societies, empowering individuals at the expense of governments and hierarchical 
organizations. As current events demonstrate, the United States is not immune to these forces and it 
would be a mistake to believe that any one nation can control globalization to serve only its national 
interests. 
Demographic pressures are a second factor that is forcing a return of strategy. Although 
population growth rates have stabilized or are even in decline in most industrialized countries, 
growth rates in the developing world are unlikely to peak for decades. The difference between birth 
rates in the developed and developing world, however, is exacerbated by female infanticide and the 
use of modern technologies to increase the likelihood of male births. As a result, in the years ahead 
there will be tens of millions of unmarried males, “bare branches” to borrow a Chinese phrase.4 
These men will be drawn to the world’s mega cities in search of work, wealth and a wife, but with 
little education and resources, they will only find poverty, disease, gangs and crime. 
Some observers thus fear that the true demographic threat is not created by a general increase in 
the global population (which will peak in about 50 years anyway), but in the millions of unmarried 
males that will soon be roaming the developing world. These men might cause rioting and disorder 
locally, but globally they serve as a willing audience for ideologues and megalomaniacs.  
Various observers have noted that in the past, “excess males” have led to violence, especially as 
states have tried to harness (or rid themselves) of their energy by engaging in foreign adventures 
                                                 
4 Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, “A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia’s 
Largest Sates,” International Security Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), 5-38. 
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and war.5 Martin van Creveld and Stephen Cimbala, for example, believe that states already are 
losing their monopoly on the use of force as urban gangs and transnational movements begin rely 
increasingly on violence to achieve their objectives.6 It is thus no surprise that Usama bin Laden 
and his al-Qaeda network appeal to Islamic youth to take matters into their own hands (a modern 
idea broadcast by the information revolution) and make war against secular society and the spread 
of modernity. 
In sum, the combination of demographic pressures and the reaction to globalization have created 
a somewhat nebulous but deadly threat to the spread of democracy, technology and free markets.  
And even though some observers blame the United States specifically for somehow producing this 
backlash, it is clear that the wave of terrorism sweeping the world is not confined to a specific 
target. Instead it is directed against ideas and an ever-expanding group of like-minded people. 
According to Robert Kaplan: “While today’s world is culturally diverse, a singular, upper-middle-
class cosmopolitan culture is forming, nevertheless. As this nouvelle cuisine culture expands, so 
will the expansion of international institutions.”7 Everyone reading this chapter is a target of the 
extremists because they are part of this cosmopolitan culture. 
The Return of Strategy 
During the Cold War, the bi-polar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
with its danger of great power war, was the major threat to international peace. And the threat took 
the form of a full-scale nuclear war that would have devastated much of Asia, Europe and the 
United States. But, the Cold War was stable in two ways. First, the superpowers provided a great 
deal of international management in their respective spheres of influence and bipolarity tended to 
order international relations. Allies clustered around the superpowers. Those aligned to the United 
States tended to follow policies laid out in Washington out of shared convictions, a lack of 
alternatives or a fear of being abandoned to local enemies or the competing superpower. Moscow 
tended to enforce its edicts using networks of agents and the threat of force. As the superpowers’ 
military competition became institutionalized, however, written and unwritten rules of the game 
emerged that made the competition more predictable, thereby reducing the possibility of accidents 
and miscalculations that can lead to war.8 
Second, stability took the form of an absence of great power war, which was in turn produced 
by the situation of mutual assured destruction. Neither superpower could mount a nuclear attack 
that could prevent retaliation from the other superpower. Defense dominance existed in the sense 
that both superpowers could guarantee that their competitor could not win a nuclear exchange. 
Under these circumstances, major war was removed as a realistic option in dealing with the 
opposing superpower.9 Proxy wars occurred on the periphery of the cold war competition in places 
                                                 
5 There is nothing new about these Malthusian and Darwinian images of how demographic pressures must find an outlet 
in war. See Henry Mayhew, London Labor and the London Poor (Dover: Dover Publishers, 1983); Robert L. 
O’Connell, Ride of the Second Horseman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Daniel Pick, War 
Machine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
6  Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991); and Stephen J. Cimbala, The Politics 
of Warfare: The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1997). 
7  Robert Kaplan, Warrior Politics (New York: Random House, 2002), 143. 
8 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); John Lewis Gaddis, “ The 
Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security 10 (Spring 1986), 
105-110; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea,” International 
Security Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), 154-184. 
9  James J. Wirtz, “Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability after the Cold War,” in T.V. Paul, Richard 
Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds.) The Absolute Weapon Revisited (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 
137-163; and Colin Gray, Weapons Don’t Make War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 15.  
-16- 
James Wirtz Ethics and the Return to Strategy 
like Vietnam, Africa, Latin America and Afghanistan, but the nuclear standoff decreased the 
likelihood that these wars would escalate to threaten the truly vital interests of the opposing 
superpowers.  
The different strategic demands created by the need to guarantee nuclear retaliation and the need 
to deal with relatively small conventional military conflicts led to rather unique military 
organizations. The United States, and the Soviet Union for that matter, actually created distinct 
military organizations to conduct deterrent and war fighting operations. U.S. conventional and 
paramilitary forces stationed outside Western Europe and South Korea, for example, were intended 
to respond to and contain the small wars and disturbances that were occurring throughout the 
developing world. These forces actually saw combat in places like Nicaragua, Vietnam, Grenada 
and Afghanistan. By contrast, strategic deterrent forces – the bulk of U.S. conventional forces, 
nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and long-
range bombers – were never actually employed in combat. Strategic nuclear deterrent forces were 
deployed throughout the Cold War with only one mission in mind: to guarantee the destruction of 
the opposing superpower under any circumstances.10 
Given the primary emphasis on deterrence during the Cold War, ethical concerns were most 
often raised about the fact that peace apparently rested on the mutual threat of nuclear annihilation.  
The Catholic bishops critique of nuclear deterrence, issued in a pastoral letter on 3 May 1983, 
actually went so far as to advocate specific arms control measures and to call into question the basis 
of nuclear deterrence, retaliation.  According to the bishops: 
“It is never permitted to direct nuclear or conventional weapons to the indiscriminate 
destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their populations . . ." (The Pastoral Constitution on 
the Church in the Modern World, No. 80).  
The intentional killing of innocent civilians or noncombatants is always wrong. 
Even defensive response to unjust attack can cause destruction, which violates the principle of 
proportionality, going far beyond the limits of legitimate defense. This judgment is particularly 
important when assessing planned use of nuclear weapons. No defensive strategy, nuclear or 
conventional, which exceeds the limits of proportionality, is morally permissible.11 
These misgivings about the morality of nuclear retaliation were not limited to the clergy. 
Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, for example, in his “Freedom from 
Fear” paper, also raised concerns inside the Reagan administration about the immorality of nuclear 
deterrence as the basis of U.S. defense policy.12 
Today, the situation has changed drastically. Great power war, or the possibility of a massive 
nuclear exchange, no longer preoccupies policymakers, officers and publics around the world.  
Instead, the primary threat facing the United States, its allies and its friends is terrorism, ethnic 
violence and a few small states that seek to use force to intimidate their neighbors or to enslave their 
own populations.  Even the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction has changed significantly 
since the end of the Cold War.  Although Russia and the United States cut back their nuclear 
arsenals and made major strides toward eliminating their offensive chemical and biological 
weapons capability, nonproliferation efforts during the 1990s failed to stop the gradual spread of 
weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems. Today, there is a distinct possibility 
                                                 
10 James Smith, “Deterrence and Defense in the Early Twenty-First Century,” Evolution of the Concepts,” paper 
presented at the workshop “Deterrence and Defense in the Early Twenty-Fist Century,” Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC) Mclean, VA, 27-28 June 2002. 
11 U.S. Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on War and Peace May 3, 1983, 
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/docs/1983/830503-usrcb-war-peace.html; for a fine analysis of the bishops’ letter see 
Susan Moller Okin, “Taking the Bishops Seriously,” World Politics Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), 527-554. 
12 Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 150. 
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that nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists. 
Many fear that these weapons might be used in relatively small-scale attacks on some distant 
battlefield or against the cities and military bases of America’s friends and allies. 
This changing threat environment has prompted policymakers to reconsider deterrence as the 
cornerstone of defense policies.13  Terrorists, for example, are difficult to deter because they seek 
war and destruction; threatening them with war and destruction in retaliation for some unwanted act 
produces no deterrent effect.  Other actors – Saddam Hussein is a case in point – are willing to seize 
opportunities to achieve their objectives through war. In other words, Iraq can generally be deterred 
from aggressive action, but when opportunities emerge Saddam is likely to pursue his objectives 
(e.g., the Iran-Iraq War and the invasion of Kuwait) through violence.  Additionally, unlike the 
Soviet Union, the danger of retaliation posed by states that have recently obtained WMD is 
relatively low; raising the possibility that military force could disarm opponents before they can 
strike. These developments mean the preventive motivation for war — the belief that war involving 
a particular adversary is inevitable — is on the rise. Once policymakers decide conflict is inevitable, 
they must make one of the most difficult and horrific diplomatic decisions in international relations. 
Leaders have to make military and political judgments about the level of risk the nation is prepared 
to accept and decide whether it is better to fight now while the costs are relatively low, or wait and 
possibly confront a more dangerous adversary. 
Changes in U.S. military structure and policy reflect this renewed attention to the issues of 
preventive war, preemption and war fighting.  The cold-war division between deterrent and war 
fighting forces is beginning to fade. On the one hand, forces that were designed to be part of the 
strategic nuclear deterrent, e.g., the B-2 bomber, now see action as part of conventional and even 
counter-terrorist attacks in the skies above Afghanistan. On the other hand, the 2001 Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR), unveiled a new strategic triad, consisting of nuclear weapons and non-
nuclear precision-strike capabilities, passive and active defenses. The Bush administration’s new 
strategic triad is intended to integrate defenses (i.e., missile defense), nuclear weapons and “non-
nuclear strike forces”14 into a seamless web of capabilities to dissuade potential competitors from 
mounting a military challenge to the United States,15 to deter adversaries and to fight and win wars 
if deterrence fails.  The NPR notes that the strike elements  
“…can provide greater flexibility in the design and conduct of military campaigns to 
defeat opponents decisively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities may be particularly useful to 
limit collateral damage and conflict escalation. The NPR emphasizes technology as a 
substitute for nuclear forces that are withdrawn from service.  Global real-time 
command and control and reconnaissance capabilities will take on greater importance 
in the new strategic triad.”16 
The ethical challenges created by the return to strategy are different from the challenges created 
by Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence. Today, elected officials and soldiers must 
now consider the actual use of force, not just the morality of threatening violence to prevent 
violence from occurring. They now have to decide issues of when, where and how to employ force 
                                                 
13 Keith B. Payne and C. Dale Walton, “Deterrence in the Post-Cold War World,” in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot 
Cohen and Colin S. Gray (eds.) Strategy in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
161-182. 
14 News Transcript from the United States Department of Defense, Briefing by J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, International Security Policy, Wednesday, January 9, 2002, 6.  
15 The concept of dissuasion is a new term in U.S. doctrine.  It apparently suggests  that U.S. military forces will be so 
technologically and operationally superior, that potential competitors will abandon efforts to challenge the United 
States. Efforts at dissuasion, however, might simply channel the military strategies and capabilities of potential 
competitors away from U.S. strengths to attack U.S. vulnerabilities, i.e., to adopt asymmetric strategies.   
16 The NPR can be found at the globalsecurity.org website <http://globalsecurity. org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm> 
12-13. 
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while recognizing that their decisions will have immediate and operational consequences.  At the 
same time, they are likely to face restive publics who demand protection from terrorists. Ultimately, 
the real challenge faced by military professionals everywhere is to win the war against terrorism on 
civilization’s terms by stopping or destroying terrorists before they can cause states to react in ways 
that undermine the democratic and ethical principles that govern society. 
Ethical Issues and Non-Issues 
The ethical issues raised by the return to strategy are mixed. On the one hand, the news is good. 
There are signs that a global solidarity is emerging against terror and anarchy. Citizens in the 
United States, Russia and India view terrorist attacks against civilians with a common revulsion and 
they support the actions taken by governments around the globe to stop the terrorist threat. People 
everywhere accept the notion that anti-terrorism operations regrettably result in the loss of innocent 
life, but that does not stop them from supporting a vigorous government response to terrorism. 
Virtually no criticism of the Russian government was heard, for instance, following the use of gas 
to disable Chechen rebels holding hundreds of people hostage in a Moscow theater, even though the 
operation lead to the death of at least one hundred hostages.  Instead of undermining democracy, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, terrorists are highlighting the important role played by 
ethics and international law when it comes to the use of force in world politics. 
Additionally, there is a happy convergence between the ethical conduct of war and the latest 
weapons systems.  The combination of real time intelligence, precision guided weapons, and the 
latest communications technology allows the United States and many of its allies to use military 
force with extraordinary discrimination.  Civilian casualties in war can never be eliminated, but it 
now appears that they can be kept to the absolute minimum. This has not always been the case in 
warfare. During World War II, “inaccuracy of weapon aim- fostered inhumanity of war aim,” as 
Bomber Command sought to demoralize German workers after finding they lacked a weapon 
accurate enough to destroy Nazi war industries.17  The spread of weapons of mass destruction 
threatens to reverse the trend toward discrimination in military operations by virtually guaranteeing 
that thousands or even millions of civilians will become casualties in war. 
Professional soldiers also are increasingly aware of their ethical and legal responsibilities when 
it comes to the conduct of military operations. Although it is not particularly well known, teams of 
lawyers must pass judgment on the morality and legal justification of virtually every significant 
military operation undertaken by the U.S. military. Operations are assessed on a variety of ethical 
and legal criteria, including military necessity, proportionality in the use of force and the risk posed 
to innocent civilians.  When mistakes occur, moreover, they are quickly acknowledged and 
rectified.  For example, when analysts realized that cluster bomb munitions and air-dropped 
humanitarian relief supplies were both painted blue, causing casualties among children who 
collected unexploded ordinance instead of food, those responsible took steps to rectify the problem. 
On the other hand, the return of strategy has produced several important ethical dilemmas. U.S. 
policymakers are now considering the issue of preventive war (launching a war today to prevent the 
need to fight a more costly war in the future) and preemption (beating opponents that are about to 
attack you to the punch by attacking them first). The Bush administration’s National Security 
Strategy states: “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are 
able to threaten or to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and 
friends.”18 The potential targets for action using these assumptions are: (1) terrorists; (2) states that 
harbor or support terrorist organizations; (3) states that are developing and/or maintaining weapons 
                                                 
17 B. H. Liddell Hart quoted in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1981), 12. 
18 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White  House, Washington DC, September 
2002, 14. 
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of mass destruction that do not conduct themselves in accordance with generally accepted norms of 
international behavior.  Much of the debate over preventive war and preemption, however, is based 
on the ethical and legal implications of specific initiatives, not on the ethical considerations 
generally raised by policies to meet today’s pressing security threats. The war on terrorism clearly is 
a war fought in self-defense against actors with little or no standing in international law, who have 
attacked innocent civilians around the world to advance often non-negotiable agendas. If Iraq’s 
failure to comply with U.N. resolutions continues, than the international community would be 
within its legal rights to use force to obtain Iraq’s compliance with international law. Still, talk of 
the need for preventive war and preemption highlights the fact that debates about the ethics of 
various defense policies will now center on the use of force, not just using the threat of force as an 
instrument of foreign policy. 
The growing isolation of military organizations from the rest of society raises another concern. 
In the United States, this isolation is partly produced by the “ghosts of Vietnam.” In other words, 
members of the U.S. military generally believe that indecisive civilian leadership, not ineffective 
military operations and strategy or an especially determined opponent, caused defeat in the Vietnam 
War.19 As a result, they tend to doubt the willingness of their elected leaders and fellow citizens at 
home to stay the course in a conflict, especially when the going gets tough. The failure of senior 
officers and elected officials to provide convincing explanations not only to the rank and file, but 
also to officers about “why we fight” and the important contribution they are making to 
international and national security only makes matters worse. Educational programs in militaries 
everywhere tend to focus on technical and operational matters, not on providing officers with the 
analytical skills and knowledge they will need to deal with broad political, strategic and ethical 
issues. When combined, these trends exacerbate the tendency of officers to focus on operational, 
tactical and technical issues at the expense of understanding the strategic consequences of military 
action. Consideration of military ethics in such an environment generally falls by the wayside. 
The impact of the information revolution on military organizations also will give rise to ethical 
issues. For the most part, senior officers view emerging communication and computing 
technologies as force multipliers that might even lead to a so-called “Revolution in Military 
Affairs.” But the same forces unleashed by the information revolution on civil society also will 
begin to transform hierarchical military organizations. Modern communication technologies tend to 
undermine the chain of command because they link the most junior person in the military 
organization directly to the upper most ranks of military leadership. At the moment, staff officers 
and military protocol prevent these networks from being fully exploited. But as future recruits enter 
the military – individuals who are more accustomed to using Internet-based communication systems 
in civilian life – they will attempt to exploit military communication networks to their full potential. 
Senior officers might even encourage this behavior because future operations will place increasing 
amounts of responsibility on the shoulders of those populating the lower ranks. With this increased 
responsibility will come demands by the rank and file for civilian and military leaders to justify 
military operations and national strategy. It is thus possible that new military organizations and 
command relationships will begin to emerge, requiring a reevaluation of how to guarantee the 
ethical conduct of military operations in highly decentralized military organizations. 
If technological change creates pressures for the long-term transformation of military 
organizations, these pressures produce immediate ethical dilemmas for military officers as they face 
the need to make changes that affect not only their service, but also their very career. 
“Transformation,” to borrow a term popular in the Bush administration’s Pentagon, involves the 
replacement of existing weapons systems, career paths, and preferred ways of conducting business 
with new weapons and ways of war to respond more effectively to emerging threats. Thus, by 
                                                 
19 Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2002); and James J.Wirtz, “The ‘Unlessons’ of Vietnam,” Defense Analysis Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 
2001), 41-58.  
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definition, transformation poses a threat to existing bureaucratic preferences. This creates all sorts 
of ethical dilemmas for professional soldiers who are asked to set aside their bureaucratic biases and 
preferences, to say nothing of tried and true weapons and procedures, to transform their 
organization to meet new threats. As transformation accelerates, soldiers will face increasing 
bureaucratic and personal incentives to fight organizational change to preserve specific career 
paths.20  In effect, today’s military professional faces many opportunities to demonstrate ethical 
leadership, and not all of these decisions must be made on the battlefield. Today careerism and the 
need to balance personal, organizational and national interests create real tests of ethics in the 
military profession. Everyone knows officers who have failed to meet those tests. 
Conclusion 
When scholars, theologians and strategists gather to discuss issues of military ethics, they are 
drawn naturally to the extreme moral dilemmas facing today’s soldier. This focus is understandable, 
given the fact that soldiers make life and death decisions that can affect the health and livelihoods 
of thousands of people. And today, more so than during the Cold War, policymakers and soldiers 
need to understand the ethical implications of decisions about when, where and how to use force to 
achieve national objectives and to protect innocent civilians targeted by the current wave of 
terrorism. The focus on these grand issues, however, should not obscure the importance of ethical 
behavior and ethical awareness in the mundane day-to-day operations and decisions undertaken by 
professional militaries. 
Ethical behavior is encouraged by organizations that reward ethical behavior. But in the 
everyday rush of normal operations, officers are pressured to make decisions based on expediency 
and the need not to rock the organizational boat.  Incentives are clear when it come to ignoring 
problems or protecting institutional interests. The way officers rise to meet these everyday 
challenges to ethical behavior, however, communicates much to the rank and file about how true the 
institution is to its values. Moreover, the communication revolution will make command decisions 
increasingly transparent to the average soldier, which has the potential either to bolster or eliminate 
confidence in the moral fiber of an officer corps. It is becoming increasingly difficult to hide 
questionable behavior from widespread scrutiny. Soldiers and policymakers alike must recognize 
that ethical behavior is not just desirable on philosophical grounds; it is desirable in a practical 
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20 The literature here is extensive.  For example see Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell, 1991); 
and Robert O’Connell, Sacred Vessels (New York: Oxford, 1991). 
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